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NOTES
AND THEN THERE WERE NONE: THE
REPEAL OF SODOMY LAWS AFTER
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND ITS EFFECT ON
THE CUSTODY AND VISITATION RIGHTS
OF GAY AND
LESBIAN PARENTS
JENNIFER NAEGER t
INTRODUCTION
Sodomy laws, which authorize the government to dictate
what behavior is appropriate in the bedroom, have historically
been extremely controversial. These laws criminalize either
same-sex acts1 or certain gender-neutral, non-procreative sexual
conduct.2 For the past third of a century, however, sodomy laws
have rarely been enforced. 3 Instead, they were used mainly as
t J.D. Candidate, June 2005, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2000
Emory University.
1 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (West 1979) (defining "sexual misconduct"
as "sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex").
2 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (2003) (stating that the commission of
sodomy occurs "when he or she performs or submits to any sexual act involving the
sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another"); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-
29-59 (1972) ("Every person who shall be convicted of the detestable and abominable
crime against nature committed with mankind or with a beast, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not more than ten years."). The
Mississippi statute contains very expansive language with limited defining factors
and can easily be interpreted according to a judge's moral views. It exemplifies one
of the most "restrictive" sodomy laws in the country. RICHARD D. MOHR,
GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW 51 n.9 (1988).
3 Many states have admitted to never prosecuting consenting adults for sodomy
engaged in privately. See, e.g., Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 118 (Mont. 1997)
(noting that "the statute has never been enforced against consenting adults");
Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 255 (Tenn. 1996) (stating "that there have
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legal justification to discriminate against homosexuality. 4
Recently, in Lawrence v. Texas,5 the Supreme Court of the
United States, by a 6-3 vote, 6 held that sodomy laws were an
unconstitutional violation of privacy and due process
guarantees.7 This landmark decision not only gives homosexuals
the right to enter into sexual relationships in the privacy of the
home "and still retain their dignity as free persons,"8 but also
provides them with legal entitlement to equal respect and equal
treatment in civil litigation in areas where they have been
disadvantaged the most 9 -namely employment,10 housing,1 and
been [no] arrests for purely private, consensual, adult, sexual activity" under
Tennessee's sodomy law); State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex. 1994)
("[T]here is no record of even a single instance in which the sodomy statute has been
prosecuted against [private consensual] conduct [between adults]."). The non-
enforcement of sodomy laws, however, was later refuted by Lawrence v. Texas, when
police arrested two adult men for engaging in consensual intimacy in the confines of
their home. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475-76 (2003).
4 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482 (noting that having a law against
homosexual conduct invites discrimination against homosexuals); Christopher R.
Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced" Sodomy Laws, 35
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 136 (2000). Some states even repealed their general
sodomy laws and enacted statutes that applied only to same-sex conduct. William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631, 664-65
(1999).
5 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
6 Id. at 2475. Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer formed
the majority. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, while Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.
7 Id. at 2484.
8 Id. at 2478. But see Associated Press, N.C. Sodomy Law Still Enforced Despite
Ruling on Texas Measure, Aug. 26, 2003 (noting that officers in Raleigh, North
Carolina will continue to charge both homosexuals and heterosexuals with sodomy
if the activity occurs in public), at http://lgrl.sitestreet.com/news/article.asp?id=379
(last visited Mar. 2, 2004); Laurence Hammack, Sodomy Ruling Might Not Alter
Much in Virginia, THE ROANOKE TIMES, July 6, 2003 (pointing out that the
Lawrence decision does not repeal sodomy laws that cover forced sodomy or sodomy
in public, regardless of the actor's sexual orientation), available at
http://www.sodomylaws.org /usa/ virginialvanewsll0.htm (last visited Feb. 10,
2004).
9 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482 (noting that protected conduct will lead to
"[e]quality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect").
10 See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding
denial of the job of a telephone operator to a homosexual); McConnell v. Anderson,
451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971) (librarian); Glover v. Williamsburg Local Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (teacher); Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist.,
29 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Utah 1998) (same); Childers v. Dallas Police Dep't, 513 F.
Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (police officer), aff'd, 669 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1982).
11 See, e.g., Hubert v. Williams, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1982).
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parenthood 12-and puts homosexuals in a better position in court
to fight for equal treatment in the military.13
This Note will analyze how the Lawrence decision and the
repeal of sodomy laws will affect one particular area of civil
litigation--child custody disputes involving gay and lesbian
parents. This Note focuses entirely on natural parents. Cases
between a parent and a non-parent, termination of parental
rights, adoption, and foster parents are beyond the scope of this
piece. Part I addresses the origin of sodomy through the Court's
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,1 4 which called attention to
homosexual discrimination, and the spin-off effects of the
decision. Part II discusses the facts and holding of Lawrence v.
Texas and the grounds on which the Court came to its ruling.
Part III provides background information on how family courts
resolve child custody disputes and the rationale employed to
justify the denial of custody or restriction of visitation rights of
gay and lesbian parents. Finally, Part IV analyzes how the
Lawrence decision and the repeal of sodomy laws will change
this custody discrimination.
12 See, e.g., L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (reasoning that,
because an intimate same-sex relationship is illegal, a parent involved in such a
relationship is unsuitable for child custody); In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (restricting visitation), aff'd, 362 A.2d 54 (1976); Jacobson
v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981), overruled in part by Damron v. Damron,
670 N.W.2d 871 (N.D. 2003).
13 See, e.g., Rich v. Sec'y of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding
that a serviceman's discharge did not violate his substantive due process rights,
because the government's interests in preventing armed servicemen from engaging
in homosexual conduct outweighed any privacy interests); see also Erik Stetson,
Military Matters: Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Will it Fall?, SOUNDINGS NEWS, July 2, 2003
(noting that the sodomy laws have helped to justify the military's homosexual ban),
available at http://www.soundingsnews.com/soundings-arc-pages/07.02.03.html#arc
07 (last visited Mar. 2, 2004). The repeal of sodomy laws will not automatically
change the military's policy on homosexuality, because it has "broad discretion to
promulgate regulations regarding eligibility for military service." Rich, 735 F.2d at
1224 n.1.
14 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
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I. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF SODOMY LAWS LEADING UP TO
LAWRENCE
A. The Development and Status of Sodomy Laws Before Bowers
Delineating the ebb and flow of sodomy laws throughout
history is an elaborate task beyond the scope of this Note, 15 but it
is important to identify a few notable ripples in order to
understand the state of the law when the Supreme Court came
face to face with Bowers. The aversion to sodomy is so deeply
rooted that it is necessary to trace its origin back to biblical
times. The term "sodomy" comes from the biblical city of Sodom,
which God destroyed because of its corrupt and immoral
customs. 16 During the Middle Ages, sodomy was considered a
religious offense regulated by ecclesiastical courts. 17 The crime
consisted of "a range of nonmarital, nonprocreative sexual
practices. Nonprocreation was the central offense and the core of
the crime."' 8
The influence of Christianity made sodomy a secular
crime. 19 As the Colonial period ended in the eighteenth century,
the United States came into existence and adopted, along with
the rest of the English common law, the offense of sodomy.20
These laws criminalized non-procreative, heterosexual
intimacy-not homosexual conduct in particular. 21 As the
15 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992) (giving a detailed
discussion on the history of regulation of sexuality).
16 Genesis 13; see Pauline G. Feist, State v. Baxley: A Disappointing Louisiana
Supreme Court Decision, 21 S.U. L. REV. 129, 132 (1994).
17 Feist, supra note 16, at 133. Sodomy was so severe that those who were
found guilty received a merciless punishment, such as "burning at the stake,
hanging, drowning, or being buried alive." Id.
18 Nan Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 533 (1992)
(citing JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 30 (1988)). Because reproduction was the only permissible
reason to engage in sexual activity, any intimate conduct that would not result in
procreation was forbidden, including "masturbation ... contraceptive intercourse
and possibly even sex with one's infertile spouse." POSNER, supra note 15, at 46.
19 WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT
OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY: 1760-1830, 39 (1975) (stating that
colonial law was in effect religious law, and "all crime was ... synonymous with
sin").
20 Feist, supra note 16, at 133 (noting that the restriction against sodomy
appeared in America during the formation of the states).
21 JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 4 (1988).
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nineteenth century unfolded, almost every state had adopted
laws prohibiting sodomy.22 Society's focus, however, gradually
shifted away from governmental control and left the regulation
of private, sexual conduct "largely to the family."23
Although sodomy laws remained on the books in most
states, the government stayed at arms length with respect to
their regulation. 24 In 1955, the American Law Institute (ALI)
transformed the practice of non-enforcement into an official
acknowledgement when it decided that the Model Penal Code
would not include sodomy laws. 25 The ALI started a trend of
decriminalization 26 that began in 1961 with the state of Illinois. 27
When the Bowers case was brought before the Supreme Court in
1986, twenty-six state legislatures had abolished their sodomy
laws, either by legislative repeal or judicial intervention. 28
The striking down of sodomy laws was consistent with the
open-minded attitudes of popular culture, which favored a more
liberated outlook on sexual behavior that diverged from the
strict principles of the past.29 This sexual freedom took the focus
22 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986) (listing sodomy
statutes in effect in 1868 for thirty-two of the thirty-seven States in the Union),
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2427 (2003).
23 D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 21, at 66-67 (noting that the government
became familiar with the concept of separation of church and state and doctors, as
opposed to clergy, monitored sexuality).
24 See RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHERINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERICA'S
SEX LAWS 66 (1996) ("Prosecutions for sodomy are today almost entirely limited
either to sexual conduct in a public place ... or sexual conduct involving force or
lack of consent, where a sexual assault charge would be difficult to prove."); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet: American Regulation of
Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1015 (1997). There were no
reported convictions for private, consensual sodomy in the nineteenth century
before 1880. Id.; see supra note 3. The lack of reported convictions, however, does
not necessarily prove there were no convictions or guilty pleas.
25 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
26 See Hunter, supra note 18, at 538-39 (illustrating the trend of compliance
with the Model Penal Code).
27 Eskridge, Jr., supra note 4, at 662.
28 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). Before Bowers, constitutional challenges to sodomy
laws were extremely uncommon. See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney of
Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976); Kelly
v. State, 412 A.2d 1274 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980), affd sub nom., Neville v. State,
430 A.2d 570 (Md. 1981).
29 See D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 21, at 300 (noting that much of the
population practiced a substantial portion of the non-reproductive sex acts
prohibited by sodomy laws).
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off of heterosexual intimacy, but because prejudice against
homosexuals continued to exist and the gay rights movement
made homosexual culture more visible, 30 the new outlook on
sexuality indirectly strengthened the link between sodomy laws
and homosexuals. Concerned legislatures reacted by amending
the laws to apply only to same-sex intimacy and interpreted
gender-neutral statutes as if they applied solely to gays and
lesbians. 31 The Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick
emphasized the negative sentiment toward homosexuality 32 and
illustrated just how sodomy laws served as a means of legal
discrimination. 33
B. Bowers v. Hardwick: A Brief Synopsis
Although Bowers was not the first constitutional challenge
to sodomy laws to reach the Supreme Court,34 it did create the
most fervent backlash from gay rights activists, and with good
reason. 35 In August 1982, an Atlanta police officer arrived at
30 American Civil Liberties Union, Why Sodomy Laws Matter (commenting on
why sodomy laws were aimed at gay people in the 1970s), at
http://www.aclu.org/gete qual/whymatter.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2004).
31 Id. Kansas, Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Tennessee,
and Texas rewrote their sodomy statutes to criminalize only same-sex intimacy.
Similarly, Maryland and Oklahoma courts decided not to apply sodomy laws to
private heterosexual conduct, "leaving what amounted to same-sex only laws in
effect." Id. Other states applied sodomy laws as if they only targeted gay people,
though in reality, they were gender-neutral. Id.; see also MOHR, supra note 2, at 51
n.9 (discussing that if states 'liberalize" heterosexual couples from criminalization
but not homosexuals, such statutes "should raise serious questions of the laws'
validity under rights to equal protection"). Because of this inequality, some states
ignored their sodomy statutes altogether. See, e.g., In re R.E.W., 471 S.E.2d 6 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1996) (disregarding the state sodomy statute when awarding visitation
rights to the gay father, who admitted to engaging in illegal sex acts).
32 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (noting that the belief that "homosexual sodomy
is immoral and unacceptable" would provide a rational basis for Georgia to
implement its sodomy statute).
33 Hunter, supra note 18, at 538-39; see supra notes 10-13; see also D'EMILIO &
FREEDMAN, supra note 21, at 345-54 (explaining the sexual politics of social
conservatives); American Civil Liberties Union, Getting Rid of Sodomy Laws:
History and Strategy that Led to the Lawrence Decision (noting that the Supreme
Court's ruling in Bowers was an example of how a sodomy statute that regulates the
sexual intimacy of all couples can be twisted to apply only to homosexual conduct),
at http://www.aclu.org/getequal/gettingrid.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2004)
[hereinafter Getting Rid].
34 See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney of Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g
403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
35 See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
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Michael Hardwick's house "to confront him with an unpaid ticket
for public drunkenness" and his subsequent failure to appear in
court.36 A half-asleep houseguest responded to the officer's
knock and directed him to Hardwick's bedroom.37 Through a
partially open door, the officer either witnessed or heard
Hardwick and his companion engaging in consensual sex acts.38
The officer barged into the bedroom and arrested both men for
violating Georgia's sodomy law.39 Hardwick challenged the
constitutionality of the statute, claiming that it violated his due
process right to privacy.40 He based his argument on a line of
privacy cases decided by the Supreme Court, which recognized
that consenting adults have the fundamental right to form
intimate personal relationships within the protective shelter of
the home-a right which cannot be hindered by the government
without a compelling justification. 41 After much debate among
the lower courts, 42 the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 43
36 MOHR, supra note 2, at 52; Teresa M. Bruce, Doing the Nasty: An Argument
for Bringing Same-Sex Erotic Conduct Back into the Courtroom, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 1135, 1135 (1996); see also Getting Rid, supra note 33 (calling the officer's
reason for entering Hardwick's house a "flimsy excuse").
37 Bruce, supra note 36, at 1135. The houseguest did not know that Hardwick
and his companion were together in the room. Id. at 1135 n.3.
38 Id. at 1135.
39 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1986) (charging Hardwick with
"violating the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy by committing that act with
another adult male in the bedroom of [his] home"), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
40 Id. at 188.
41 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (extending
the right of privacy to sexual intimacy of unmarried individuals); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (same); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
486 (1965) (protecting the liberty interest of married individuals to engage in sexual
intimacy).
42 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188-89. "The District Court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, relying on Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney of Richmond." Id. at 188. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reversed, distinguishing Doe and holding that the Georgia statute
violated Hardwick's fundamental right to engage in homosexual activity in private.
The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case, ordering the State to provide a compelling
interest in support of the statute as well as evidence that the statute was the "most
narrowly drawn means of achieving that end." Id. at 189. The Supreme Court
pointed out that other courts of appeals came to opposite findings to that of the
Eleventh Circuit. Id. (citing Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) and
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
43 Id. Bowers, the Georgia Attorney General, filed the appeal to the Supreme
Court on behalf of the State. Id.
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Narrowing the issue exclusively to whether the Constitution
conferred to homosexuals a fundamental right to engage in
consensual sodomy, the Court held by a 5-4 vote that the
constitutional right to privacy does not extend to homosexual
intimacy. 44  The "protection of public morality"45 provided a
legitimate state interest to prohibit such a crime; therefore,
Georgia needed only a rational basis for sustaining its statute.46
In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused a disproportionate
amount of its opinion on the historical analysis of the "illegality
of gay sex. '47 What really stood out, however, was the fact that
the Court took a sodomy statute that did not explicitly refer to
same-sex intimacy and, nevertheless, selectively applied it to
homosexuals. 48 The majority's "utter contempt" for homosexual
conduct was apparent when the Court stated that "it was
'facetious' to argue the fundamental right to privacy protected
gay people. '49
The Bowers dissent stressed several key factors in urging
the unconstitutionality of Georgia's sodomy statute, concepts
which would later be endorsed by the majority in Lawrence v.
Texas. First, the focus should be on "'the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the
right to be let alone.' "50 This issue is much broader than
44 Id. at 190. The Court stated that there is a constitutional right to privacy in
situations dealing with marriage, procreation, and family, but that right does not
include homosexual conduct. Id. at 190-92; see MOHR, supra note 2, at 49-50. The
majority could have followed the dissent's line of reasoning and applied a broad
interpretation of the Constitution in order to reach the conclusion that all
individuals have a fundamental right to maintain intimate, personal relationships.
See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
45 Bruce, supra note 36, at 1143.
46 Id. at 1142-43; see Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (noting that substantive due
process does not extend to such "immoral and unacceptable" conduct).
47 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94 (citing Yao Apasu-Gbotsu et al., Survey on
the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 521, 525 (1986)). In his concurring opinion, Justice Burger found that
the proscription of sodomy was "firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical
standards," id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring), and to interpret the Constitution
as to provide homosexuals with the fundamental right to engage in sodomy "would
be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching," id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
See generally Bruce, supra note 36, at 1142 (commenting that scholars have widely
criticized the Bowers opinion for its historical inaccuracy and its reliance on a single
law review article).
48 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 200-01 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
49 Getting Rid, supra note 33 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194).
50 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v.
[Vol.78:397
RIGHTS OF GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS
whether homosexuals have a fundamental right to engage in
sodomy. Second, morality should not be the decisive factor in
upholding the constitutionality of a statute, especially "if the
grounds upon which [the law] was laid down have vanished long
since."51 The dissent noted that the majority's "obsessive focus
on homosexual activity" was not warranted because Georgia's
sodomy statute was gender-neutral, thereby also criminalizing
heterosexual sodomy.52 Finally, the dissent argued that the
Court had already "recognized a privacy interest with reference
to certain decisions that are properly for the individual to
make,"53 and that this protection extends to the confines of the
home.54 The petitioners, therefore, should have the right to
decide how to conduct personal relationships without
governmental intrusion.
C. The Aftermath of Bowers
Discrimination against homosexuals existed before Bowers,55
but by upholding the constitutionality of sodomy laws, the Court
created spin-off effects far beyond the consequences of
prosecution. 56 First, the Bowers decision indirectly encouraged
state governments to "create a criminal class" out of
homosexuals, 57 regardless of whether they actually partook in
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
51 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Oliver Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)).
52 Id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (citing Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) and Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36
(1925)).
54 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,
716-17 (1984), Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) and Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253, 260-62 (1960)).
55 See supra notes 10-13.
56 See Feist, supra note 16, at 138 (citing a speech at an ALI meeting
concerning the decriminalization of sex offenses in which Judge Learned Hand
stated, "[Ciriminal law which is not enforced practically is much worse than if it
was not on the books at all. I think homosexuality is a matter of morals, a matter
very largely of taste, and is not a matter that people should be put in prison
about."). It is important to note that state governments kept sodomy laws on the
books to send a message that homosexuality was unacceptable. "Statutes have
significance completely independent of their actual enforcement. Law reflects
society and informs it." Leslie, supra note 4, at 114.
57 Leslie, supra note 4, at 110 (pointing out that state governments were able to
indirectly criminalize homosexuals through the use of sodomy laws). "Labeling gay
men and lesbians as 'criminal[s]' facilitates discrimination because the law permits
20041
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such illegal conduct. 58 The ruling reaffirmed the judiciary's right
to uphold anti-gay sentiment in areas of civil litigation and
provided opponents of civil rights with ammunition that did not
sound blatantly prejudiced. 59 For example, courts continued to
justify discrimination against gay and lesbian employees and job
applicants, 60 to separate children from their gay and lesbian
parents by denying custody or restricting visitation,6 1 to uphold
the removal of competent homosexuals from military service,62
and to suppress gay people from publicly exercising their First
Amendment rights.63 In addition, the continued existence of
differential treatment of criminals." Id. at 115.
58 See Bruce, supra note 36, at 1149-51; see Feist, supra note 16, at 138 (noting
that even if homosexuals wanted to engage in sodomy, the prohibition of such
conduct may "inhibit persons from fulfilling their sexual desires").
59 See MOHR, supra note 2, at 55-56 (pointing out that judges tend to base their
decisions on public policy, so the continued existence of sodomy laws may influence
the way judges apply the law).
60 See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1110-11 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding
that an offer of employment could be revoked based on the future employee's same-
sex wedding ceremony); Todd v. Navarro, 698 F. Supp. 871, 876-77 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(holding that the Broward Sheriffs Office could dismiss the plaintiffs case because
she was an admitted lesbian); Truesdale v. Univ. of N.C., 371 S.E.2d 503, 509 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1988) (giving police departments permission to terminate or to refuse to
hire gay and lesbian employees), overruled by Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 413 S.E.2d
276 (N.C. 1992).
61 See, e.g., Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987)
(denying custody to a mother because sodomy is seen as "immoral, unacceptable,
and criminal conduct"); Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581, 586-88 (Miss. 1999)
(denying a gay father's request to modify denial of custody even though the child
lives with the mother's new husband, who is a convicted felon and wife abuser);
S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (favoring the custody
rights of alcoholic father over those of the lesbian mother).
62 See, e.g., Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1429 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that
the discharge of a service member for engaging in homosexual conduct did not
violate constitutional rights); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(justifying the discharge of an FBI agent for homosexual conduct on the grounds
that special deference is given to military decisions regarding security clearances
and national security, and the fact that the right to engage in consensual sodomy is
not "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 191 (1986))).
63 See People for the American Way Foundation, Anti-Gay Politics and the
Religious Right: Gays and the GOP (commenting on the fact that politically active
homosexuals are deterred from conveying their beliefs in conventional political
environments because of the existence of sodomy statutes), available at
http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=2038 (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
"For example, the Texas Republican party refused to let Log Cabin Republicans, a
gay Republican organization, set up an exhibit booth at the state Republican
convention, because sodomy [was] a crime in Texas." Leslie, supra note 4, at 157
n.365.
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sodomy laws was an unremitting "assault" on the dignity of
homosexuals, 64 and prohibiting sexual intimacy, which is often
important to one's mental health and happiness, may very well
have caused psychological harm to gays and lesbians. 65
Although Bowers created a huge hurdle for gay rights
activists, not all of its repercussions were bad. After pushing
state legislatures and clogging state courts with arguments
against sodomy laws, activists revived the earlier trend-repeal
and invalidation.66 When Lawrence reached the Supreme Court,
half of the states that had sodomy statutes when Bowers was
decided no longer had such laws, 67 including Georgia itself.68
Additionally, the Court decided two principal cases after
Bowers that indirectly questioned its validity. In Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,69 the Court
stressed the expansiveness of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause, which includes "personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
64 MOHR, supra note 2, at 58-59. Being continually judged without regard to
individual merits or accomplishments can have a profound effect on one's self-
esteem. Id. at 59; cf. Claudia Card, Evils and Inequalities, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 87, 92-93 (1998) (explaining that discrimination against African-Americans
and the ensuing assaults on their dignity have led to "unspeakable violence, terror,
poverty and degradation").
65 Evan Wolfson & Robert S. Mower, When the Police are in Our Bedrooms,
Shouldn't the Courts Go in After Them?: An Update on the Fight Against "Sodomy"
Laws, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 997, 1130-31 (1994) (noting that the repression of the
homosexual expression of intimacy can lead to harmful results). The "enforced
repression of desire for such [sexual] expression is associated with dysfunction and
pathology." Id. at 1030. But see MOHR, supra note 2, at 54 (noting that sodomy laws
are not the initiating cause of psychological damage in homosexuals; therefore, little
weight should be given to such a claim).
66 Getting Rid, supra note 33. Seven years after Bowers, Nevada was the first
state to repeal its sodomy law and many others followed. Id. In regard to the
invalidation -of sodomy laws, many state high courts have held that state
constitutions provide more protection for individual rights than does the federal
constitution. Id.; see, e.g., Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 121-22 (Mont. 1997)
(observing that Montana's Constitution explicitly grants all Montana citizens the
right to individual privacy, which includes the right to engage in consensual, private
homosexual intimacy).
67 Sodomy Laws in the United States, at http://www.sodomylaws.org (last
modified Dec. 14, 2003). By the time Lawrence was decided in 2003, ten states had
gender-neutral sodomy laws and only four states, including Texas, had sodomy laws
that only applied to homosexuals. Id.
68 See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998) (striking down Georgia's
law criminalizing non-commercial, private consensual adult sodomy-the law
involved in Bowers).
69 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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[parenthood], and education."70  The second landmark decision
was Romer v. Evans,7 1  which invalidated a Colorado
constitutional amendment that barred equal rights laws for
homosexuals.7 2 The Court acknowledged that gays and lesbians
were entitled to equal protection, 73 and stated that "if a law
neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class,"
it would be upheld "so long as it bears a rational relation to some
legitimate end. '7 4 After concluding that the sole purpose of the
Colorado amendment was to harm homosexuals, the Court
declared it unconstitutional.7 5 The Romer decision, however, can
be seen as consistent with Bowers. That is, the Court upheld
Georgia's sodomy statute as constitutional because homosexuals
did not have a fundamental right to engage in sodomy, and
protection against the immorality of homosexual conduct
provided a legitimate reason for the statute. 76
The variability of case law and the gradual approval of
homosexuality in American society enabled Lawrence v. Texas,
another challenge to the constitutionality of sodomy laws, to find
itself before a receptive Supreme Court. The Court, in turn,
provided gays and lesbians with its single most influential
decision to date.
II. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
Responding to a reported weapons disturbance, officers of
the Harris County Police Department in Houston, Texas entered
the apartment of John Lawrence, where they observed him and
another male, Tyron Garner, engaging in sexual acts.77 Both
men were arrested, jailed overnight, charged, and convicted
before a Justice of the Peace 78 for violating Texas Penal Code
70 Id. at 851. Casey indirectly raised the question of whether the right to
autonomy in these circumstances applies to homosexuals as well as to
heterosexuals. Under Bowers, homosexuals would have been denied this right.
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482 (2003).
71 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
72 Id. at 632.
73 Id. at 635-36.
74 Id. at 631.
75 Id. at 633.
76 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
77 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475-76. No one questioned the right of
the police to enter Lawrence's apartment. Id. at 2475.
78 Id. at 2476.
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section 21.06, which criminalized "deviate sexual intercourse" for
same-sex couples but not for opposite-sex couples. 79
Both petitioners felt that section 21.06 violated their federal
constitutional guarantees of privacy and equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment80 and like provisions of the Texas
Constitution;8 ' therefore, they exercised their right to a trial de
novo in Harris County Criminal Court.8 2  Petitioners'
constitutional arguments were rejected, so they took the case to
the Texas Court of Appeals, which affirmed the convictions.8 3
The court of appeals rationalized its decision on principles of
morality, holding that Texas could treat same-sex couples
differently from opposite-sex couples in order to express its
disapproval of homosexuality.8 4 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to address the constitutionality of the
Texas sodomy statute, and in doing so, reconsidered its holding
in Bowers.8 5
First, the Court discussed the zone of liberty protected under
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution and whether private,
sexual intimacy between consenting adults could be carved out of
that zone.8 6 Because there has never been a specific formula
defining the substantive reach of the Due Process Clause,8 7 the
Court used its past decisions and their underlying rationales as
79 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003). It reads, "[a] person
commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
individual of the same sex." The statute defines "[d]eviate sexual intercourse" as
"(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or
anus of another person; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another
person with an object." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01(1).
80 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
81 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a.
82 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476.
83 Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001), rev'd, Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). The court heard the case en banc and in a divided
opinion, rejected petitioners' federal due process arguments based on the controlling
Bowers decision. Id. at 365-66 (Fowler, J., concurring).
84 Id. at 354.
85 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476. The Supreme Court was not compelled to
reconsider its holding in Bowers, because the Texas sodomy statute was limited to
homosexuals, unlike the gender-neutral Georgia sodomy statute. See infra text
accompanying notes 104-05.
86 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476-77.
87 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating
that the liberty protected under the Due Process Clause has never been "determined
by reference to any code").
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signposts.88 These cases recognized a fundamental right to
develop personal relationships, as well as the right to engage in
private, sexual intimacy, regardless of marriage or procreation.8 9
The Texas statute's only purpose was to prohibit a sexual act
that fell "within the liberty of persons to choose without being
punished as criminals."9° The majority noted that the issue in
Bowers, whether homosexuals had the right to partake of certain
sexual activity, was simply too narrow.91  Having
"misapprehended the claim of liberty.., presented to it," the
Bowers Court trivialized the "far-reaching consequences" of
criminal sodomy laws. 92
Next, the Court addressed the history of laws banning
sodomy in America, and after a thorough review, concluded that
such statutes were not distinctly directed at homosexual conduct
until quite recently. 93 Moreover, they were rarely enforced
against consenting adults acting in private. 94 The Bowers Court
88 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (extending the right
of privacy to engage in sexual intimacy to unmarried individuals); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing the fundamental right of women to define the destiny
of their pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (recognizing unmarried
individuals' right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(recognizing married couples' right to privacy); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) (protecting parents' right to control the rearing of their children); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (same).
89 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478. Although not mentioned in Lawrence, the
Court had recognized in earlier cases that the right to privacy from needless
governmental intrusion protects the home and the activities conducted there. See
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (reasoning that the home provides
a place for individuals to conduct "those intimate activities that the [Fourth]
Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference"); United States v.
Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) ("The Constitution extends special safeguards to the
privacy of the home, just as it protects other special privacy rights."); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (protecting the right to read obscene material in
the privacy of one's home, even if that material is illegal to possess); Poe, 367 U.S. at
551 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[I]f the physical curtilage of the home is protected, it is
surely as a result of solicitude to protect the privacies of the life within.").
90 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
91 Id.; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). The Due Process Clause protects those liberties that
are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Id. at 192 (quoting Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)); cf. County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[H]istory and tradition
are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due
process inquiry.").
92 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
93 Id. at 2479; see supra notes 18, 21 and accompanying text.
94 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2479; see supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
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based its ruling on the notion that "[p]roscriptions against
[homosexual] conduct have ancient roots,"95 thus relying almost
entirely on a flawed reconstruction of American history.96
Although ethical and moral beliefs provide a solid
foundation on which to lead one's life, the Lawrence Court stated
that such principles are an insufficient reason to uphold a
criminal law.97 The Court's "obligation is to define the liberty of
all, not to mandate [its] own moral code."9 8  Criminal offenses
have a negative effect on the dignity of the individual charged,
and convictions carry "collateral consequences" that invite
discrimination against homosexuals. 99
In reconsidering Bowers, the Court also examined the recent
trend in case law.'00  Specifically, it considered Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, and Romer v.
Evans, which expanded the fundamental rights to privacy. 101
Finally, the Court noted that international forums, including the
European Court of Human Rights, afford homosexual adults the
right to engage in intimate, sexual conduct. 10 2
After careful analysis, the Court concluded that petitioners'
"right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the
full right to engage in [private, sexual] conduct without
intervention of the government .... The Texas statute furthers
no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into
95 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
96 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480.
97 Id. Many criminal statutes have been based on a state's moral views, but if
those laws compromise an individual's fundamental liberty, they are
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (plurality opinion) ("Men and women of good conscience can
disagree, and we suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and
spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy .. "); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (invalidating a law prohibiting the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)
(protecting interracial marriage); cf. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (stating that because
homosexual sodomy is unacceptable and immoral, it provides a rational basis for
upholding the Georgia sodomy law).
98 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 850).
99 Id. at 2482; see supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text. The Court
provides several examples of these "collateral consequences," including notations of
conviction on records and job applications and registration as a sex offender under
state law. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
100 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481-82.
101 See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
102 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.
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the personal and private life of the individual."'' 0 3 The majority
could have chosen simply to distinguish Bowers by declaring the
Texas sodomy statute, which only criminalized homosexual
sodomy, unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. 10 4
Instead, the Court completely overruled it by holding
unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds all statutes
that interfere with an adult's right to engage in private,
consensual sexual conduct. 0 5  The Lawrence decision
undermines every ruling that has relied on Bowers. After
Lawrence, every sodomy statute that pertains to private, sexual
conduct between consenting adults is now unconstitutional.
III. CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION RIGHTS OF GAY AND
LESBIAN PARENTS BEFORE LAWRENCE
A. Background in Family Law
The Supreme Court has deemed the right to have and raise
children a fundamental liberty,10 6 deserving protection against
all but compelling state interests. 10 7 This level of protection,
however, is jeopardized when a family is torn apart by divorce or
legal separation and parents find it impossible to agree on child
custody arrangements. 0 8 As a result, courts make the initial
103 Id. at 2484.
104 See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the decision should be based
on equal protection).
105 See id.
106 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1971) ("The private interest.., of
a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and,
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection."); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 518 (1924) (stating that parents should have the freedom to guide
their child both intellectually and religiously); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (reasoning that the right to conceive and raise one's child is "essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men").
107 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 96 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(noting that protecting a child from harm provides a "compelling state interest" that
overrides a parent's fundamental right to raise his or her own child); Christensen v.
State, 468 S.E.2d 188, 190 (Ga. 1996) (holding that the "furtherance of the moral
welfare of the public" provides a compelling state interest to prohibit sodomy). See
generally Sheila Reynolds & Roy B. Lacoursiere, Interminable Child
Neglect/Custody Cases: Are There Better Alternatives?, 21 J. FAM. L. 239, 264-65,
269-73 (1982-83) (noting that what qualifies as a compelling interest may vary
depending on the state).
108 Vicki Parrott, The Effect on the Child of a Custodial Parent's Involvement in
an Intimate Same-Sex Relationship-North Carolina Adopts the "Nexus Test" in
Pulliam v. Smith, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 131, 138 (1996). Although a parent has a
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allocation with respect to marriage dissolution and the non-
custodial parent's visitation rights. 10 9 Statutes110 and case law'11
require courts to determine child care disputes based on the best
interests of the child, which is determined by weighing the
positive and negative characteristics of one party against those
of all opposing parties and placing the child with the one that is
best able to serve the child's needs.'1 2 At a later point, one
parent may petition for a modification of existing custody by
showing that the child's current living conditions endanger his or
her welfare and that a change in custody would benefit the
child." 3
Unfortunately, the "best interests of the child" standard is
vaguely defined." 4 Judges have broad discretionary power to
protect the children brought before them and can deem virtually
fundamental right to raise his or her own child, the child's well-being takes
precedence over the parent's liberty interest in the course of a custody or visitation
dispute. See, e.g., Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 833 (4th Cir. 1982).
109 Parrott, supra note 108, at 138. With respect to visitation privileges, courts
generally allocate them on a reasonable basis in order to foster the relationship
between the child and non-custodial parent. See, e.g., Boswell v. Boswell, 701 A.2d
1153, 1163 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (noting that a parent can see his or her child
at reasonable times if the child is not in his or her custody), affd, 721 A.2d 662 (Md.
1998).
110 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (Supp. 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
46b-56 (West 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3 (1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.025
(West 1988); see also UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402 (1987).
11 See, e.g., Bull v. Bull, 24 Cal. Rptr. 149, 150 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962)
(stating that between a choice of two households, a child's best interests will be met
where he or she will be "better cared for, better trained, more secure and happier");
Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433-34, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925) ("The
chancellor ... acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of the child.
He is to put himself in the position of a 'wise, affectionate and careful
parent'.., and make provision for the child accordingly."); Wolff v. Wolff, 349
N.W.2d 656, 658 (S.D. 1984).
112 Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1508, 1629 (1989) (citing A. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY CASES
§§ 3.06, 7.07 (1983)) [hereinafter Developments].
113 Parrott, supra note 108, at 138-39; e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 877
(Alaska 1985) ("[T]hen one party seeks a change in custody, a court must consider
whether there are changed circumstances which justify modifying a prior custody
order."); see also UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 409(a)-(b) (stating that to
change a custody order, there must be reason to believe the child's current
environment may seriously jeopardize his "physical, mental, moral, or emotional
health").
114 For example, many state statutes and case rulings do not provide the judge
with a list of factors to consider when determining what is best for the child's
welfare. See supra note 111.
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any factor relevant to the child's welfare. 115 This flexibility may
help to avoid an arbitrary judgment that clashes with a child's
essential needs, but it invites discrimination that may ultimately
result in the child's best interests being sacrificed and allows
judges to be swayed by their own biases. 116
B. Current Law Applied to Gay and Lesbian Parents
Because many gay men and lesbians have children from
heterosexual relationships or marriage, they also face potential
custody litigation.11 7 In a dispute where one of the contestants is
homosexual, the court, depending on the state of jurisdiction,
may interpret the applicable statute to "permit consideration of
the parent's sexual orientation."'1 Generally, this is done only if
the homosexual parent is involved in a same-sex relationship. 119
115 Parrott, supra note 108, at 138.
116 Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Fails Lesbian and Gay
Parents and Their Children, 71 IND. L.J. 623, 647 (1996) ("In addition to... genuine
concerns, some judges appear to be motivated by general hostility towards lesbian
and gay parents and a desire to punish these individuals for living in a manner
which the court finds unacceptable."); see, e.g., Ward v. Ward, 742 So. 2d 250, 252-
55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (removing child from custody of lesbian mother and
granting custody to the father, who had served an eight-year prison term for the
second-degree murder of his first wife); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108
(Va. 1995) (removing child from custody of loving and nurturing mother because she
engaged in criminal, immoral sexual behavior with her live-in partner). In addition,
appellate courts will only reverse a trial court's denial of custody if there is a clear
abuse of discretion; therefore, the trial court's decision is generally final. See
Developments, supra note 112, at 1630.
117 Although the concept may conflict with how society traditionally views gay
men and lesbians, millions of children in the United States are raised by
homosexual parents. See Leslie, supra note 4, at 147.
118 Developments, supra note 112, at 1631; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1983)
(listing "moral character" of the parent as a factor); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West
Supp. 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-15 (West 1983) (listing the "emotional
environment" provided by the parent as a factor). There are no cases that
specifically consider sexual orientation when evaluating a child's "emotional
environment," but statutes leave room for interpretation. For example, a court has
held that a harmful emotional environment exists if the child is "exceptionally
deprived of appropriate modeling," which prejudiced judges may construe to include
children living with homosexual parents. In re Y.D.R., 567 N.E.2d 872, 873-74 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that the children were in extreme emotional pain and
suffered from low self-esteem and depression due to neglect of the parents).
119 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981) ("Sandra's
homosexuality may, indeed, be... beyond her control. However, living with another
person of the same sex in a sexual relationship is not .. "), overruled in part by
Damron v. Damron, 670 N.W.2d 871 (N.D. 2003); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 967
(Okla. 1982) (holding that an "acknowledged homosexual relationship" sufficiently
justified a change in custody); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) (implying
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Courts apply one of three standards when determining whether
homosexuality harms or will likely harm the child: the "nexus
test," the "permissive determinative inference" approach, or the
"per se" rule. 120
A majority of states have adopted the "nexus test."121 Courts
may consider a parent's sexual orientation as a factor, but it
cannot be the sole basis for denying custody without evidence
from the contesting parent 122 that the gay or lesbian parent's
conduct has harmed the child, or in other words, that there is a
nexus between homosexuality and parental unfitness.1 23 Under
the nexus test, harm cannot be presumed, but must be
determined on a case-by-case basis. 124 Courts, therefore, hold
that the state cannot separate a parent and a child "merely
because that parent's lifestyle is not within the societal
mainstream."125
For example, in S.N.E. v. R.L.B.,' 26 the Alaska Supreme
Court applied the nexus test in an action brought by the father,
who sought a change of custody due to the mother's involvement
that it was not the father's homosexuality but his continuous exposure of the child
to his "immoral and illicit relationship" that rendered him unfit as a custodial
parent).
120 See Shapiro, supra note 116, at 635-41.
121 Id. at 635 n.67 (noting that courts use the test in an effort to assess an
"individual's fitness as a parent").
122 See id. at 636-37 (noting that the heterosexual father in the Van Driel case
was not granted custody because he gave no evidence showing that the lesbian
mother adversely affected the children's well-being); see also infra note 124.
123 Shapiro, supra note 116, at 635-36; see also D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286,
293 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) ("[H]omosexuality standing alone without evidence of any
adverse effect upon the welfare of the child does not render the homosexual parent
unfit as a matter of law to have custody of the child.").
124 Shapiro, supra note 116, at 636. Compare Van Driel v. Van Driel, 525
N.W.2d 37, 39 (S.D. 1994) (reasoning that the mother's sexual orientation "must be
shown to have had some harmful effect on the children"), with Chicoine v. Chicoine,
479 N.W.2d 891, 893-94 (S.D. 1992) (holding that the South Dakota trial court
abused its discretion when it authorized overnight, unsupervised visitation with the
lesbian mother, even though there was no evidence of harm to the child).
125 In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886, 890 (Wash. 1983) (Stafford, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704
(S.C. Ct. App. 1987). The court emphasized the importance of an evidentiary
showing of impact on the child by holding that "[a] parent's morality, while a proper
factor for consideration, 'is limited in its force to what relevancy it has, either
directly or indirectly, to the welfare of the child.'" Id. at 705 (quoting Davenport v.
Davenport, 220 S.E.2d 228, 230 (S.C. 1975) (affirming a decision granting custody to
the mother despite her adulterous affair)).
126 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
in a homosexual relationship. 127 The father claimed that the
mother was emotionally unstable and that he was the child's
primary parent. 128  The trial court granted custody to the
father, 129  but the supreme court reversed, holding that
"[c]onsideration of a parent's conduct is appropriate only when
the evidence supports a finding that a parent's conduct has or
reasonably will have an adverse impact on the child and his best
interests."1 30 In addition, the court refused to consider the social
stigma attached to a parent's status as a homosexual, finding it
relevant only upon evidence of detrimental impact.131
The "permissive determinative inference" approach is a
rebuttable presumption of unfitness, which explicitly places the
burden on the homosexual parent to prove that his or her sexual
orientation will not harm the child. 132 If no evidence is offered,
"the permissible inference is one that, standing alone, can justify
the court's decision to deny custody" to the homosexual parent
and grant it to the avowedly heterosexual parent. 133
In Ex parte J.M.F.,134 the Alabama Supreme Court rejected
the notion that there must be evidence of a detrimental impact
on the child in order to support a change of custody.1 35 The
father, who had recently remarried, sought to gain custody of his
child from the openly lesbian mother.1 36 The supreme court held
127 Id. at 878.
128 Id. at 877.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 879.
131 Id. ("Simply put, it is impermissible to rely on any real or imagined social
stigma attaching to Mother's status as a lesbian.").
132 Developments, supra note 112, at 1631.
133 Shapiro, supra note 116, at 634; e.g., Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510,
513 (Ark Ct. App. 1987) ("[Ilt has never been necessary to prove that illicit sexual
conduct on the part of the custodial parent is detrimental to the children. Arkansas
courts have presumed that it is."); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985) (holding that "the burden of proving no adverse effect of the
homosexual relationship falls on the person advocating"); see also Pulliam v. Smith,
501 S.E.2d 898 (N.C. 1998). The North Carolina Supreme Court approved the trial
court's decision to modify custody from the gay father to the mother, presuming that
the conduct between the father and his gay partner was "improper" and therefore
"detrimental to the best interest and welfare of the two minor children." Id. at 904,
construed in Parrot, supra note 108.
134 730 So. 2d 1190 (Ala. 1998).
135 See id. at 1196 (refusing to support an illegal and immoral relationship
despite evidence that the mother had been a good parent).
136 Id. (stating that the father only had to show that the change in custody
would materially promote the child's best interests and the positive effects brought
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that the establishment of marriage was the societal and moral
norm-thus it was in the child's best interests for the
heterosexual father to gain custody. 137 Although the court did
not explicitly declare the mother's homosexual conduct to be
presumptively detrimental to the child, 138 it asserted that
"[w]hile the evidence shows that the mother loves the child and
has provided her with good care, it also shows that she has
chosen to expose the child continuously to a lifestyle that is
'neither legal in this state, nor moral in the eyes of most of its
citizens.' "139
'The last standard employed by state courts is the "per se"
rule, which applies an irrebuttable presumption against grants
of dustody to parents involved in a homosexual relationship.1 40
Where an adequate heterosexual parent or relative is available,
courts assume that awarding custody to gay and lesbian parents
is never in the best interests of the child.141
Bottoms v. Bottoms 42 is the most highly publicized case
utilizing this standard. After the mother admitted being
involved in a homosexual relationship, the Virginia trial court
awarded custody to the grandmother, ruling that the lesbian
mother's "illegal" and "immoral" conduct rendered her an unfit
about by this change would "more than offset the inherent [disruptive effect of]
uprooting the child").
137 Id.
138 See Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include
Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 392, 410-11 (2001) (noting that some courts presume parents who
are in heterosexual relationships to be the "more prudent custodial choice"). The
essay cited the J.M.F. decision as one where a state court, without evidence,
presumed the heterosexual relationship was "successful," and the "developmental
benefit" of such a marriage to children was "undisputed." Id. at 411.
139 J.M.F., 730 So. 2d at 1196 (quoting Ex parte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793, 796
(Ala. 1998)); see also Diana Lauretta, Protecting the Child's Best Interests: Defending
Second-Parent Adoptions Granted Prior to the 2002 Enactment of California
Assembly Bill 25, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 173, 193 (2003) (noting that "[tlhe
court focused on the sexual orientation of the parents, rather than the relationship
between the mother and child").
140 Shapiro, supra note 116, at 637 (noting that lesbian and gay parents are in a
"particular category" that simply will not get custody of their children).
141 Id.
142 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995). The Bottoms case followed the ruling in Roe v.
Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985), where the Virginia Supreme Court held that if
a parent was involved in a same-sex relationship, the court was required to deny
custody and grant extremely limited visitation. Shapiro, supra note 116, at 631.
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parent as a matter of law. 143 The court of appeals reversed,
concluding that "the evidence fails to prove [that the mother]
abused or neglected her son, that her lesbian
relationship ... has or will have a deleterious effect on her son,
or that she is an unfit parent."1 44 The grandmother appealed to
the Virginia Supreme Court, which overturned the appeals court
ruling and reinstated the trial court's order granting custody to
the grandmother. 45 In reaching its decision, the supreme court
expressed concern about the long-term consequences of being
raised by lesbians, namely the social condemnation that may be
imposed on the child. 146 This case illustrates a major flaw of the
per se rule: that a loving homosexual parent can lose custody of
his or her child, regardless of the lack of negative influence.
Thus, this rule destroys precisely what it seeks to protect-the
best interests of the child.
Courts that have religiously applied the per se rule in the
past seem to be treating homosexuality with slightly more
tolerance. Recently, in J.A.D. v. F.J.D.,147 the Supreme Court of
Missouri reconsidered the notion that a parent who engages in
same-sex intimacy of any sort is automatically unfit. 148 The
court held that a parent's homosexuality was still presumed to
have a detrimental impact on the child's welfare but could no
longer be considered "ipso facto" parental unfitness.149
In addition to custody determinations, the "best interests of
the child" standard is also applied to establish visitation rights of
gay and lesbian parents. 150 Although no court has completely
denied visitation rights based on a parent's sexual orientation,
some courts have restricted such privileges to protect children
from what they presume to be harmful conduct. 151  These
143 Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 279-80 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
144 Id. at 278. The court continued, "To the contrary, the evidence showed that
[the mother] is and has been a fit and nurturing parent who has adequately
provided and cared for her son." Id.
145 Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 108-09.
146 Id. at 108.
147 978 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1998).
148 Heidi C. Doerhoff, Assessing the Best Interests of the Child: Missouri
Declares that a Homosexual Parent is Not Ipso Facto Unfit for Custody, 64 Mo. L.
REV. 949, 950-51 (1999).
149 Id. at 951.
150 Developments, supra note 112, at 1629.
151 See Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Restrictions on Parent's Child
Visitation Rights Based on Parent's Sexual Conduct, 99 A.L.R. 5th 475, 475 (2002);
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restrictions have included prohibiting the child from overnight
visits, taking the child to the home that the homosexual parent
shares with his or her same-sex partner, taking the child to
homosexual gatherings, and being in the presence of the same-
sex companion. 152 Other courts, however, have declined to limit
visitation rights without evidence of harm justifying those
restrictions. 153
C. Sodomy Laws and Other Rationales Behind Custody and
Visitation Discrimination
Courts that restrict visitation rights or deny custody to gay
and lesbian parents under the permissive determinative
inference approach or per se rule consistently cite a combination
of five factors in support of their decisions. 154  First, in
recognizing the intensity of prejudice against homosexuals,
courts express concern about children being harassed or teased
by their peers. 155  Second, courts fear that a child, through
extended exposure to the homosexual lifestyle, will develop a
same-sex orientation. 56 Third, based on the notion that same-
see, e.g., Ex parte D.W.W., 717 So, 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998); T.K.T. v. F.P.T., 716 So.
2d 1235, 1238 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (justifying visitation restrictions between
homosexual parents and their children by stating that overexposure to such illicit
sexual relationships was bound to have a detrimental impact).
152 Miller, supra note 151, at 475.
153 Id.; see, e.g., In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287, 290 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that visitation can be restricted only upon a showing of actual or
potential harm to the child resulting from the parent's homosexual conduct);
Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662, 665, 672 (Md. 1998).
154 Developments, supra note 112, at 1637-38.
155 Id. at 1637; Parrott, supra note 108, at 147 (noting that children of
homosexual parents could face "social condemnation and humiliation"). Compare
Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981), M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966,
969 (Okla. 1982) (holding that the child would be socially stigmatized if he lived
with the homosexual parent), and Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1981), with Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (stating that simply
because a child may suffer ridicule from her peers because her white mother
remarried an African-American man does not justify removing the child from her
home, because the law is not concerned with people's particular prejudices).
156 Parrott, supra note 108, at 149-50; Developments, supra note 112, at 1637-
38. Compare S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (removing daughter
from custody of mother on the belief that the daughter "may have difficulties in
achieving a fulfilling heterosexual identity of her own in the future"), and N.K.M. v.
L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) ("[Although homosexuality may be
a] permissible life style,... who would place a child in a milieu where she may be
inclined toward it?"), with Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 986 (Ohio Ct. App.
1987) (concluding that "there is no consensus on what causes homosexuality, but
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sex intimacy demonstrates immorality, courts believe that living
with a homosexual parent may have an adverse affect on the
child's moral development. 15 7 Fourth, courts fear that a child
may be sexually molested by the parent or the parent's
friends. 158 Finally, courts frequently cite state sodomy laws as a
factor.1 59
there is substantial consensus among experts that being raised by a homosexual
parent does not increase the likelihood that a child will become homosexual")
(emphasis added). But see J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
("[E]xpert testimony is not a necessary basis for a determination that exposure to a
homosexual influence will adversely affect a child. . . . 'the father's acknowledgment
that he was living with an avowed homosexual certainly augurs for potential harm
to the child that the trial court was perfectly competent to assess."') (emphasis
omitted).
157 Developments, supra note 112, at 1638; see, e.g., Immerman v. Immerman, 1
Cal. Rptr. 298, 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (reasoning that the custody order in favor of
the mother was "clearly erroneous" because evidence of her homosexuality should
have been admitted as relevant to her "moral character, acts, conduct and
disposition"); Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985)
(finding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to condition the
homosexual father's visitation rights because homosexuality is "errant sexual
behavior which threatens the social fabric"). But see M.A.B. v. R.B., 134 Misc.2d
317, 323-24, 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 964 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1986). The court
stated:
If defendant [who is involved in a same-sex relationship], retains custody, .
. .this does not necessarily portend that their moral welfare or safety will
be jeopardized. It is just as reasonable to expect that they will emerge
better equipped to search out their own standards of right and wrong,
better able to perceive that the majority is not always correct in its moral
judgments, and better able to understand the importance of conforming
their beliefs to the requirements of reason and tested knowledge, not the
constraints of currently popular sentiment or prejudice.
Id. at 324, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 964 (quoting M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1262-63 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979)), construed in Parrott, supra note 108, at 150-51.
158 Developments, supra note 112, at 1638; see, e.g., J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643
S.W.2d 865, 867, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (restricting father's visitation because of
the court's refusal to believe that ninety-five percent of molestation is heterosexual
and stating, "Every trial judge ... knows that the molestation of minor boys by
adult males is not as uncommon as the psychological experts' testimony indicated").
159 Developments, supra note 112, at 1638; see, e.g., Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730
S.W.2d 510, 514 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (Craft, J., concurring) (noting that
constituents of the state, through legislative action, claimed that "sodomy is
immoral, unacceptable, and criminal conduct"); J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 792, 794 (citing
a sodomy statute to restrict gay father's visitation rights and as proof of the state's
interest in condemning homosexuality); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985) (noting that, although Pennsylvania did not have a sodomy statute,
a lesbian mother may be subject to arrest if she traveled to states with such
statutes); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108-09 (Va. 1995) (transferring
custody of a son from the mother to the maternal grandmother in part because the
mother actively practiced lesbianism in the home); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694
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The most powerful and seemingly least prejudicial reason
for denying custody and restricting visitation rights of gay and
lesbian parents is state sodomy laws, because other factors
simply lack evidence showing a link between them and a child's
best interests. 160 Courts are apprehensive about placing a child
in the home of a homosexual parent who is presumed to be
engaging in behavior deemed illegal by the state, 16 1 and claim
that sodomy statutes "embody a state interest against
homosexuality."16 2 Despite the lack of evidence that "the parent
in question actually participated in any statutorily prohibited
conduct," the courts, nonetheless, infer that sodomy laws have
been violated. 163 The result is that homosexual parents are
punished for breaking criminal laws "without having been
afforded any of the procedural protections normally guaranteed
to criminal defendants."1 6 4 In addition, the presumption of
illegality allows courts to selectively invoke sodomy laws against
homosexual parents when they cannot otherwise show parental
(Va. 1985) (granting sole custody to the mother because the "father's continuous
exposure of the child to his immoral and illicit relationship renders him an unfit and
improper custodian as a matter of law").
160 Developments, supra note 112, at 1638-40.
161 Leslie, supra note 4, at 148. "Empirically, it appears more likely that courts
will not take children away from gay or lesbian parents in states without sodomy
laws." Id. at 148 n.304.
162 Developments, supra note 112, at 1638; see also Stephen Beale, In Defense of
Sodomy Laws, BROWN DAILY HERALD, July 12, 2003 (noting that sexuality shapes
important social structures; therefore, the state has good reason to criminalize
conduct that could "erode the legitimacy of the family"). He states:
Sexuality. . . serves as the basis for the family-the most important social
institution. Dysfunctional families correlate with poverty, illegitimacy and
crime. Society obviously has at least a legitimate interest-if not a
compelling interest-invested in sexual morality. Sodomy laws serve this
legitimate state interest in sexuality by passively reinforcing the
institution of traditional marriage. This ancillary role insures the cultural
hegemony of the family.
Id.
163 Custody Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal Protection
Analysis, 102 HARV. L. REV. 617, 635 (1989) [hereinafter Custody Denials]; see, e.g.,
Ex parte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998) ("[T]he conduct inherent in
lesbianism is illegal in Alabama."); Constant A., 496 A.2d at 5 ("[Plermitting the
appellant the freedom to travel could clearly place the children in a
situation ... where the adults could be subject to arrest and prosecution for deviant
sexual behavior."); Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 108 (noting that the "[clonduct inherent
in lesbianism" was a felony that could properly be taken into account when
determining the custodial placement).
164 Leslie, supra note 4, at 150.
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unfitness,165 even if the particular state in which the family lives
does not make such conduct criminal.' 66 Finally, a decision
based solely on sexual conduct has no link to the best interests of
the child and plays no role in the child's well being, assuming, of
course, that the child is neither present during the sexual
activity nor aware of its occurrence, 167 which would be equally
true of heterosexual intimacy.
IV. WILL GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS STILL BE DISCRIMINATED
AGAINST IN CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES?
The Lawrence Court not only recognized that Bowers was
out of sync with its recent privacy decisions, and thus wrongly
decided, 168 but also that Bowers had been used to justify every
kind of discrimination against gay people because of the criminal
stigma attached to their sexual intimacy. 169 By grounding its
ruling in the privacy and liberty interests protected by the Due
Process Clause, 70 the majority gave Lawrence the necessary
sweep to undo certain forms of discrimination.
Although prejudice against homosexuality has not
instantaneously vanished, the Lawrence decision will have a
direct and immediate influence on child custody disputes. First
and foremost, sodomy laws can no longer provide a legal
justification for custody discrimination. The repeal of these
statutes will cause a dramatic departure from the presumption
that homosexuality is detrimental to a child's welfare, with the
greatest impact being felt in recalcitrant states such as Missouri,
Virginia, and Alabama. 171  Prejudiced judges cannot deny
165 Id. at 151-52.
166 See Constant A., 496 A.2d at 5 (observing that although the Pennsylvania
sodomy law had been repealed, the mother could be arrested if she took a trip to a
state that still had such laws).
167 Custody Denials, supra note 163, at 635.
168 See supra notes 91-92, 95-96 and accompanying text.
169 American Civil Liberties Union, Why the Supreme Court Decision Striking
Down Sodomy Laws Is So Important (noting that the Lawrence Court was "well
aware of the damage that Bowers had done, and it set about to undo as much of it as
it could" by first admitting it was wrongly decided and then by overruling it), at
http://www.aclu.org/lesbiangayrights/1 esbiangayrightsmain.cfm (last visited Mar. 3,
2004).
170 See supra text accompanying note 103.
171 While most states have gradually adopted the "nexus test" to settle custody
disputes involving a gay or lesbian parent, Missouri, Alabama, and Virginia have
presumed homosexuality to have a detrimental impact, often citing sodomy statues
as evidence of the homosexual parent's criminality. See supra notes 134-39, 142-49
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custody or restrict visitation rights solely because of a parent's
sexual orientation and the reputed belief that gay and lesbian
parents are engaging in illegal behavior. All other factors aside,
homosexual parents are now on a more even playing field with
their heterosexual opponents. 172 Gay and lesbian parents will be
more confident when revealing their homosexuality, no longer
fearing that they will jeopardize their rights as parents.
Next, the repeal of sodomy laws will take the spotlight off
the parent and put it on the particular child involved in the
dispute, a shift that validates the interest of promoting the
welfare of the child. Courts-no longer focusing on the gay or
lesbian parent's illegal activity-will be more willing to
concentrate on what is truly important: the child's feelings,
wishes and developmental needs. 173 Narrow-minded judges will
not ignore factors that may actually harm a child's well being,
such as alcoholism, conviction of a violent crime, or physical
abuse. 174
Finally, the Lawrence decision demonstrates a shift in public
policy, specifically, at least in the Court's view, that private
same-sex intimacy is no longer considered detrimental to the
welfare of society. 175 Sodomy laws made certain forms of sexual
and accompanying text.
172 See Leslie, supra note 4, at 150 (noting that heterosexual parents use
sodomy laws in court to attack their homosexual former spouses).
173 See MARY ANN MASON, THE CUSTODY WARS: WHY CHILDREN ARE LOSING
THE LEGAL BATTLE AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 3, 7-9 (1999) (addressing the
fact that children are being ignored by the legal system in custody disputes, and
explaining how courts could be more child-centered in making their
determinations).
174 See Joseph Landau, Ripple Effect, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 23, 2003, at 14.
The article illustratively describes several cases where judges placed children in
environments with abusive, alcoholic adults just to avoid exposing the children to
the homosexual parent's lifestyle. For example, an Alabama Supreme Court
decision approved a custody order placing two children in the home of a violent
alcoholic father, who had beaten his wife and threatened to kill his kids, stating
that the children would be traumatized if they continuously saw their lesbian
mother engage in illegal conduct. Id.; see, e.g., Exparte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793, 796
(Ala. 1998). In another case, also in Alabama, the supreme court again used sodomy
laws as an excuse to deny custody to the lesbian mother, even though the father had
previously hit the children and whipped them with a belt. Landau, supra; see, e.g.,
Exparte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 23 (Ala. 2002); see also Ward v. Ward, 742 So. 2d 250,
255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (granting custody to the heterosexual father even
though he was previously jailed for murdering his ex-wife).
175 Following a line of cases recently decided by the Supreme Court, including
Lawrence v. Texas, the latest Gallup Poll showed that six in ten Americans approve
of the job done by the Court. See Sodomy Laws: Social Issues & Policy, July 19, 2003
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intimacy illegal on the grounds of preserving public morality. 176
But, by holding that homosexuals have the fundamental right to
engage in such acts, the Lawrence Court indirectly stated that
notions of morality no longer provide a legitimate basis for
upholding the sodomy laws. 177
When determining the best interests of the child, family
courts may consider a parent's morality, which is often assessed
by reference to behavior deemed to be associated with probity.178
Before Lawrence v. Texas, judges were inclined to target
homosexual conduct to indicate pervasive parental immorality. 179
Now, however, the rationale that homosexual conduct will
impair a child's moral development cannot be used to deny
custody to gay parents.180 Thus, absent other proof of unfitness,
homosexual parents have the constitutional right to live with
and care for their child.
CONCLUSION
Lawrence v. Texas has changed the traditional ideas
regarding homosexuals and their fundamental constitutional
rights. This decision will have a profound impact in family
courts. Judges can no longer be unconditionally unsympathetic
to gay and lesbian parents or accept without question historical
prejudices and unjustifiable theories about what happens to
children who grow up in homosexual households. The ruling
should also guarantee an impartial balancing of factors in the
"best interests of the child" standard. Unfortunately, however,
courts still have the ability to invent new reasoning within their
power of discretion to rule, just as they did under the old laws.
Beneficial to the children, however, is the fact that it will be
more difficult for judges to use moral justification to stigmatize
and punish parents for their nontraditional choices.
at http://www.sodomylaws.org/lawrence/lwnews066.htm.
176 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (stating that Georgia's
rational basis for criminalizing sodomy was to uphold public morality), overruled by
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
177 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2479-80 (2003); see supra note 97 and
accompanying text.
178 See Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704, 705 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (noting
that a parent's morality was a proper factor for family courts to consider when
making custody determinations).
179 See supra note 157.
180 See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
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Additionally, although the repeal of sodomy laws is unlikely
to have an instantaneous effect on certain realms of government-
sanctioned discrimination like the military's anti-gay policy and
bans on same-sex marriage, it will put gay people in a stronger
position in court. Hopefully, as with the rationale behind
custody discrimination, the Lawrence decision will gradually
erode the reasoning behind other prejudicial policies, and they
too will be declared unconstitutional,1 8 1 thus establishing equal
treatment for homosexuals in two more important institutions of
American society.
181 The Ontario Court of Appeals recently ruled in Halpern v. Canada, C39172,
[2003] ON.C. LEXIS 1042, that denying homosexuals the right to marry is
discriminatory and unconstitutional. The Canadian federal government will not
appeal the decision, but instead will begin drafting legislation recognizing same-sex
marriage. Michelle Mann, Will Canada Lead the Way in Same-Sex Marriage? Winds
of Change in the United States May Come From Up North, 2 ABA JOURNAL
EREPORT 27, July 11, 2003.
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